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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Balochistan Insurgency is an enduring armed and nationalist struggle between 
Baloch Insurgents and the Pakistani government, embroiling Pakistan in five insurgencies 
since 1948. This research aims to analyze why the current insurgency has outlasted its 
predecessors by over two-fold, with over fifteen years passing since the most recent 
conflict erupted. Using historical primary source news articles from 1973-1977, 
secondary research, insurgency trend data, and the data from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD); this study examines the evolution of the current conflict and analyzes 
how and why the contemporary insurgency is far more resilient. This study finds that the 
support base for the ongoing insurgency has become more robust and expansive, and 
suggests that this aspect unique to the current conflict is the major contributor to the 
insurgency’s endurance. The findings suggest the following reasons for an increased 
support base that in turn contribute to the resilience of Balochistan insurgence: first, the 
movement is now lead by an expanding middle class; second, there is no violent inter-
group rivalry among the separatist actors; third, the support platform has expanded to 
include cyberspace and social media; fourth, the current insurgency adds the Gwadar Port 
as an additional and urbanized grievance; and fifth, pre-existing grievances have yet to be 
resolved. The current insurgency’s distinct manifestation reflects a change in 
Balochistan’s status quo through a wide-ranging engagement of popular support in 
contrast to the past. 
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 1 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
On November 23rd 2018, insurgents attacked a Chinese consulate in Karachi, the 
provincial capital of Sindh province of Pakistan, in a notable attempt to undermine the 
Chinese investment in the area.1 It is not the first militant strike against the Chinese 
presence in Pakistan, and it is unlikely to be the last. The attacks come in the midst of an 
ethno-nationalist insurgency that has devastated the Balochistan province in Pakistan 
over the last fifteen years. It is the fifth conflict of its kind to take place in Balochistan. 
For decades Baloch separatists have fought the Pakistani government, military, and 
security forces over greater provincial autonomy. The most recent manifestation of the 
conflict has become the longest and most violently sustained insurgency in Pakistani 
history. Despite this, few have ever heard of Balochistan, and even fewer are familiar 
with the ongoing insurgency. Yet, the situation of Balochistan holds significant 
implications for South Asia, which reaches into some of the world’s most powerful 
stakeholders.  
To understand what gives Balochistan its regional momentum, one must first look 
towards its geography. Balochistan is situated in a geopolitical hotspot, bordering Iran 
and Afghanistan, and securing most of Pakistan’s access to the Arabian Sea. It is also 
within comfortable proximity to India and the Strait of Hormuz. The province houses 
major energy and mineral reserves, supplying 36% of Pakistan’s energy needs (Khan, 
2009). It is these features, the geopolitical and economic potential, that have brought 
investment into Balochistan, especially via China and its “One Belt, One Road” 
                                                
1 For more information see: Ahmad, M., & Masood, S. (2018, November 23). Chinese Presence in Pakistan 
Is Targeted in Strike on Consulate in Karachi.  
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initiative,2 and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The centerpiece 
of such developments is the Gwadar Port, an economic and strategic project built in 
Balochistan’s Gwadar city, designed to attract international prospects to Pakistan. While 
this already makes China a crucial player in the Balochistan case, China’s establishment 
in Pakistan consequently holds security ramifications for India, as both countries see each 
other as rival powers. The Gwadar Port can be seen as another installment of the “String 
of Pearls” theory, the Chinese encirclement of India through naval installations on 
bordering countries including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and now, Pakistan 
(Dabas, 2017).  
 
                                                
2 The “One Belt, One Road” initiative is China’s largest project with ambitions to connect over 60 
countries through Chinese-led economic and strategic investments.  
Image: China’s “String of Pearls” around India 
Dabas, M. (2017, June 23). Here Is All You Should Know About 'String Of Pearls', China's Policy To 
Encircle India. 
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What makes Pakistan distinctly important is its direct access to India. It is 
important to note that China’s border with India does not provide any real access due to 
the Himalayan mountain range, which serves as a geographic barrier between the two 
countries. As a result, the Gwadar Port creates a unique theatre for Chinese intelligence 
against India. India’s own response to the Chinese project is the Indian-invested 
Chabahar Port in Iran (Umbreen & Jahangir, 2015). 
Outside of Chinese and Indian interests in Balochistan lie the clear security implications 
for Pakistan, which faces its largest and most resource-rich province undergoing a state of 
war. This puts a serious internal stability threat on Pakistan, threatening state legitimacy. 
The presence of China in Balochistan, coupled with Pakistan’s critical need for Chinese 
investment, also puts significant pressure on the state to deal with the insurgency. While 
the conflict holds limited spilling into Afghanistan and Iran (Weinstein, 2017), this 
internal security pressure elevates Pakistan’s threat perception on India. Historically, the 
state embraces an India-centric threat perception, in which it views India as its greatest 
threat and rival since their origin in the bloody partition in 1947. The Balochistan 
insurgency, therefore, encompasses and augments a pre-existing security threat that can 
destabilize the region.  
 4 
 
 The conflict has many dimensions that transcend its physical location, but it is 
important to remember that it is not the first Baloch insurgency to plague the province. It 
is, however, the longest. The history of the province is critical to understanding what 
makes the region prone to the same separatist insurgency: Balochistan was essentially 
annexed by Pakistan after the 1947 partition that split India and Pakistan into separate 
states. It was known as the State of Kalat before it became a province of Pakistan. The 
Khan of Kalat, the then ruler of the State of Kalat, viewed Kalat’s status as a sovereign 
entity (Chawla 2014, p. 945). This meant that at the partition, he argued that the Baloch 
regions would return under the Kalat domain, rather than become part of Pakistan.3 The 
                                                
3 In a meeting with Lord Mountbatten, who was the last viceroy of India and orchestrated the negotiations 
for the partition, the Khan of Kalat referenced the treaty of 1876 which named Kalat as an independent 
Image: Map of Balochistan 
Hashmi, W. (2018). 'Fierce and Warlike': Could the Baloch Separatist Movement Remain Pakistan's 
Longest Insurgency? 
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future Pakistani government rejected this claim, but as neither side reached an agreement, 
the State of Kalat entered in a Standstill Agreement with the government of Pakistan on 
August 4th, 1947, which recognized Kalat’s sovereign status (Chawla 2014, p. 928). 
Throughout the negotiations, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, wanted 
Kalat to merge with Pakistan, but the Khan of Kalat and the representatives in the Kalat 
Government opposed this idea. By the 27th of March, however, the State of Kalat was 
forced to accede, marking the end of Kalat’s nine-month sovereignty timeline, and the 
beginning of an extensive sequence of insurgencies (Chawla 2014, p. 950).  
In the immediate aftermath of the annexation, the first insurgency occurred from 
March to September of 1948, in response to the loss of sovereignty.4 The rebellion lasted 
little more than a few months, ending in September of 1948 when the insurgents were 
forced to surrender. The second insurgency was from 1958 to 1959, in response to the 
implementation of the One Unit Policy, which would have effectively inhibited the 
Baloch identity (Khan, 2009, p. 1075). 
From 1963 to 1969 the third insurgency would arise as Baloch nationalists tried to 
counter the central government’s army posts in key areas throughout Balochistan. By the 
end of the conflict, the One Unit Policy was abolished, ultimately leading to Balochistan 
achieving province status in 1970. The fourth insurgency arose from 1973 to 1977, when 
then-Pakistani president Bhutto disbanded the coalition government in Balochistan while 
                                                                                                                                            
sovereign state whose country entered relations with the British Government; while the British held proxy 
rule in Balochistan, Kalat did not fit the criteria of an Indian State. With the British acceding sovereignty, 
Khan asserted that the State of Kalat should revert to its prior independence. For more information, see: 
Chawla, Muhammad Iqbal. "Mountbatten and Balochistan: an Appraisal." Proceedings of the Indian 
History Congress 75 (2014): 928-57.  
4 Following the forced ascension of Kalat into Pakistan, the brother of the Khan of Kalat mobilized the first 
Balochistan insurgency with the help of about five hundred Lashkars. The objective was to regain Kalat’s 
independence, but as soon as the Khan of Kalat had signed the merger, the Pakistani military flooded into 
Pakistan to quell the nationalist uprisings. 
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raising the military presence in the province. It leads to the end of the “tribal chief” 
Sardari system, and only drew to a close through a negotiated settlement, in which the 
army was withdrawn and Baloch leaders released (International Crisis Group, 2006). The 
fifth insurgency began in 2004 and is currently ongoing. It emerged from a variety of 
factors including long-standing grievances such as a lack of provincial autonomy and 
economic exploitation. This history of conflict illustrates the decades-old harbored 
feelings of marginalization, repression, and injustice of the Baloch people towards the 
Pakistani government. Many still bear resentment towards the government for forcefully 
occupying the State of Kalat.  
1.1 Research Question & Theoretical Argument 
The Balochistan insurgency is reaching its 15th year at the time of writing.5 
Research and analysis on insurgency trends favor a government victory the more 
protracted an insurgency is, suggesting that, given the length of the current insurgency, 
the government should be progressively overtaking the insurgents. Yet, the current 
insurgency has outlasted the length of its previous conflicts by over twofold. The research 
question for this project is to determine why the Balochistan insurgency has lasted as 
long as it has, and continues to unfold. The research will analyze insurgency trend 
literature indicative of the rise and fall of insurgencies, and apply such trends to the 
Balochistan case in order to suggest what factors are keeping the insurgents resilient.   
The theoretical argument is therefore the following: given that insurgent 
scholarship has suggested the importance of popular support for insurgents in allowing 
                                                
5 This research uses 2004 as the start date of the insurgency based on data indicating that the first claimed 
attack by an insurgent group was in 2004 
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them to survive, this paper hypothesizes that the protraction of the Balochistan 
Insurgency is the result of increased and sustained popular support among the insurgents. 
This research is a qualitative analysis of the Balochistan Insurgency, with a temporal 
range from 1973 (the beginning of the 4th episode) to the present.  
1.2 Layout 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter of this research is the 
introduction, and will discuss Balochistan’s history, its significance, and the thesis 
overview. This will provide a crucial context for understanding the nature of the 
insurgency. The second chapter will involve a literature review, which will be divided 
into two parts: the first part will encompass scholarship on insurgency trends; the second 
part will focus on literature on the current Balochistan insurgency. The third chapter will 
provide the research to the theoretical argument. Fourth, this study will discuss and 
analyze the evidence provided by the research, and conclude, summarize, and provide 
key findings from the research.  
 
1.3 Findings 
This research finds that increased popular support has contributed to the resilience 
of the insurgency. The current insurgency has attained increased support through a 
variety of ways. First, the insurgency is now lead by an expanding middle class, as 
opposed to solely tribal leaders. In Balochistan, the middle class refers to the rising 
young, urban, and educated population. Second, attack data also indicates that there is no 
inter-group conflict among the various insurgent groups active in the insurgency. This 
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would mean that there is some level of cohesion in sentiment across all insurgent actors, 
supporting the first point that the conflict has evolved into a class-level support group, as 
there is no violent outbidding for support between groups. Third, the methods of 
supporting the insurgency have expanded to the cyber platform through a robust social 
media movement. Fourth, the current insurgency adds an additional grievance 
represented by the Gwadar Port, in which Baloch people see this development similar to 
colonization due to the influx of foreigners—particularly Chinese workers— that the 
project has brought to the province. Finally, research has proved that the past grievances 
have largely not been resolved since the end of the last insurgency, indicating that the 
Baloch population has not had any alleviation in animosity towards the central 
government: economic data indicates a high level of underdevelopment of the province, 
discrimination by the central government, and indiscriminate attacks and human rights 
violations. These key factors driving the insurgency are symptomatic of a more extensive 
and broader support base than any past insurgency in Balochistan.  
 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Insurgency Trends: How Insurgents Survive 
Insurgencies throughout history are often unique to each case, encompassing a 
wide variety of strategy, grievances, and goals. However, there are also common factors 
among insurgencies that help explain the course of an insurgent conflict. This paper will 
define insurgency as a relatively localized, often disorganized, and violent revolt against 
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a government carried out by citizens of that government. This section will discuss the 
various trends and factors that lead to the protraction of an insurgency in order to explain 
why and how insurgents survive against a government force. This literature review 
section will inform what factors to apply to the analysis of the Balochistan Insurgency in 
Pakistan. Key trends discussed in the literature include the length of the insurgency, the 
ability to secure civilian support, external support, access to resources, sanctuary, 
intelligence, and acquisition of territory. 
Insurgencies throughout time and region are vastly different. According to RAND 
insurgency study, How Insurgencies End by Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, there is 
no definitive marker for how to predict if an insurgency movement is dying down 
(Connable & Libicki, 2010).  However, there are a range of trends that correlate with the 
trajectory and protraction of an insurgency. The RAND study, for example, found that 
government chance of victory in an insurgency improves the longer an insurgency occurs 
(Connable & Libicki, 2010). The study put the average modern insurgency as lasting 
about ten years, indicating that insurgencies that last longer are far more likely to be 
reaching an end. Factors such as access to resources are much better guaranteed in 
government forces, and by outlasting insurgents, the warfare becomes attrition-based. 
However, there are several other elements that also play a role in the protraction of an 
insurgency. For example, insurgencies with more than two groups are more likely “have 
longer, more-violent, and more-complex endings” (Connable & Libicki, 2010, p. xvi), 
due to competing interests. Therefore, factors such as unification among groups hold 
implications for the length and outcome of insurgencies. 
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The ability for either side to ensure civilian security and thereby gain civilian 
support is perhaps the most crucial factor for determining insurgency resilience. A 
civilian support base can provide assets such as intelligence, sanctuary, and resources, 
while at the same time denying those to the opposing force. Lynn suggests that the ability 
for counterinsurgents to gain a civilian support base may be far more difficult than the 
insurgent ability, because counterinsurgents must both protect the population while 
fighting to overpower the insurgents, whereas the insurgents “only have to demonstrate 
they can best protect a population or, far easier, inflict enough mayhem and destruction to 
demonstrate that the existing authorities cannot” (Lynn, p. 23, 2005). Indeed, this serves 
to undermine and delegitimize the authorities, and can even force civilians to “deal 
privately with the insurgent” in order to guarantee security (Galula & Nagl, P. 6, 2010).  
The insurgents that can consistently establish security for a population tend to gain the 
support of the neutral population as well. This can be a critical advantage for several 
reasons: first, insurgents are more likely to achieve voluntary sanctuary among the 
population, which Connable and Libicki argue increases the chance of insurgent victory; 
second, this cuts or staunches any flow of intelligence on insurgent movements from the 
civilian population to the counterinsurgents. The CIA checklist for determining the 
chance of success among insurgents considers this to be a marker for counterinsurgent 
loss (CIA, 1986). Locals within and around the insurgent areas of control are often the 
most valuable source of intelligence on insurgent movements, as insurgents operate in an 
often disorganized and decentralized fashion, making their movements difficult to track 
and unpredictable. A popular support base also provides an important asset of 
intelligence to the insurgents themselves (Trinquier, P. 55, 2008). Modern insurgencies 
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also tend to promote support through online networks. As Kilcullen notes, “globalized 
Internet communication also enables moral, financial and personnel support, creating a 
strategic hinterland or ‘virtual sanctuary’ for insurgents” (Kilcullen, P. 113, 2006). Given 
that one of the core findings of this paper is an online, media-based Balochistan support 
platform, pro-insurgent media campaigns would have direct ramifications for the 
insurgent support base. 
The significance of mobilizing popular support for insurgents is not only 
emphasized in more modern texts (Lynn, 2005; Galula, 2010; Trinquier, 2008; Jardine, 
2004; Kilcullen, 2006), but revolutionary leaders. Mao Zedong and Che Guevara 
repeatedly highlighted the role of the people in insurgent warfare. While Che Guevara 
described insurgency as a “War of the masses, a war of the people” (Guevara, P. 16, 
2006), Mao continuously referenced the mobilization of the common people as 
“inseparable” to warfare (Mao, P. 60, 1967; Mao & Griffith, P. 43, 1989).  
Intelligence in insurgencies is a critical asset for both sides because it links the 
ability for counterinsurgents and insurgents alike to employ effective violence: according 
to both Connable, Libicki (2010), and Lynn (2005), indiscriminate violence leads to a 
decrease in support for any side utilizing the tactic. Without accurate intelligence, 
counterinsurgents may use violence against civilians hidden among insurgent forces, as 
insurgents tend to be far more difficult to distinguish from civilians, leading to greater 
insurgent support and lower counterinsurgent support. Indiscriminate violence proves an 
inability to provide security to the civilian population in addition to angering the 
population for unjust losses. Similarly, the same is true for insurgent forces attacking 
counterinsurgents, although counterinsurgents (normally, government sanctioned military 
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or security forces) are almost always easily distinguished from the civilian population due 
to uniform (Lynn, 2005), an idea linked to what Galula describes as the “fluidity” and 
“rigidity” associated with insurgent and counterinsurgent positions, respectively (Galula, 
P. 7, 2010). Gaining the support of the neutral population then can create a powerful 
cycle of improving forces’ ability to wage war: by providing greater security and winning 
civilian support, the support results in more assets in the form of sanctuary, intelligence, 
and manpower, which then improves the ability to effectively wage war. 
Another trend related to the endurance of insurgencies is the level of external 
support that insurgents receive. Jones and Johnston argue that insurgents with outside 
support are far more likely to outlast counterinsurgent efforts (Jones & Johnston, 2013). 
External support tends to benefit insurgents, however, Connable and Libicki (2010) also 
note that inconsistent support can actually cripple an insurgency’s ability to wage war. 
Their study found that external support that was sustained increased the chance of 
insurgent victory, however inconsistent or partial foreign support made the insurgency 
more likely to fail. This was due to insurgents developing a dependence on foreign 
support, and then proving an inability to fill the gap once the support was retracted. 
Inconsistent, partial, or sporadic support by foreign governments is common in 
insurgencies, as most external sponsors do so for state interests, which often change 
throughout the length of insurgencies. According to Jardine, “popular support and 
external support are substitutes,” meaning that one reduces the need for the other 
(Jardine, P. 260, 2014). In this sense, the importance of external support is on par with 
popular support. Indeed, various studies conclude that insurgents with external support 
are much harder to overcome (Lyall & Wilson, P. 82, 2009; Jones & Johnston, 2013; 
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Connable & Libicki, 2010). Ultimately, a consistent flow of foreign support has the 
potential to effectively alter the outcome of an insurgency.  
These insurgency trend factors help explain why insurgencies persist and how 
they may end. They are central to understanding why insurgent groups are able to 
survive— and sometimes even thrive —against a much bigger and official force. One 
study argues that the longer an insurgency endures, the more likely it is to end, and the 
more likely government forces are able to outlast such conflicts (Connable & Libicki, 
2010). This paper seeks to understand why the current Balochistan insurgency has 
outlasted its predecessors by over two-fold. The most notable insurgent trends included 
popular and external support, as these often were platforms from which to gain access to 
resources, sanctuary, and intelligence. These factors, applied to the Balochistan case, may 
provide some insight into why and how the insurgents remain active in an insurgency that 
has become the most protracted in Pakistan since the creation of the state.  
 
 
2.2 Balochistan: Current Literature 
 
Balochistan has endured constant conflicts since its integration into Pakistan. 
Repeated insurgency, chronic underdevelopment, and perceived resource exploitation 
have left the region with a population that feels separate from the rest of Pakistan. This 
literature review section analyzes current scholarship on the insurgency in order to draw 
potential parallels, contradictions, or discrepancies between insurgency trend literature 
and the Balochistan case, particularly in areas of possible increased popular or external 
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support. Historically, the province has fought four insurgencies since it became part of 
Pakistan in 1948, however, the fifth and ongoing insurgency is the most protracted 
conflict by far, initiating in 2004. Research on the Balochistan Insurgency is 
overwhelmingly focused on the causes of the insurgency and the changes between the 
past conflicts and the present. All of these themes provide insight into how and why the 
current insurgency has lasted over fifteen years. 
Literature has identified multiple causes for the current insurgency, many of 
which have been long-standing grievances related to the perceived marginalization of the 
ethnic Baloch and repression by the Security Forces. Khan and Sana Ullah, for example, 
analyze the political system in Balochistan, and argue that it is this system that has led to 
the escalation of violence, as it has left people with no trust in the government (Ullah & 
Ullah, 2017). The Baloch community has frequently called for greater autonomy from the 
central government, but many feel that all attempted compromises to provincial 
autonomy and development have never truly amounted to anything, further instilling a 
severe lack of trust in the Pakistani government.  
In 2010, for example, the government launched the Balochistan Rights Package, 
which promised heavy development from schools to roads. Immediately after the 
announcement, people took to the roads to protest, refusing any aid from the government, 
with the Khan of Kalat explaining that Baloch people do not care for charity, and that 
sudden investment into Balochistan is “not a substitute for independence” (Khan of 
Kalat, Al Jazeera Interview, 2012). A population that feels they cannot rely on the central 
government has unified large groups of people against the rest of Pakistan. Sushant 
Sareen, a consultant of the Pakistan Project at the Institute for Defense Studies and 
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Analyses, suggests that “the alienation of the people in the Baloch populated areas of 
Balochistan with Pakistan appears to be near total” (Sareen, 2010)— an indicator that 
insurgents likely have significant civilian support. A protestor shouting in the streets of 
Quetta announced just as much: “Baloch brothers in the government, the army, or the 
police, quit your jobs and help your brothers who fight for freedom.” (Al Jazeera, 2012) 
Yet, while the government may have alienated the Baloch people, one author argues that 
most Baloch are not necessarily separatists— they just want greater autonomy (Grare, 
2013). This could suggest that any insurgent civilian support may come from other 
reasons besides just ideological alignment, such as a better security guarantee from the 
insurgents. Ultimately, however, projects such as the Balochistan Rights Package did not 
gain popular support for the central government, but rather intensified the resentment 
(Mazhar et al, 2012; Sareen, 2010; HRW, 2011).  
Other research, such as Alok Bansal’s analysis, include the lack of Baloch 
participation in economic projects throughout the province as another critical factor to 
inciting the insurgency (Bansal, 2008). Economic exploitation has given rise to a feeling 
of injustice among Balochis. Indeed, a Baloch insurgency leader remarked that “we [the 
insurgents] want to end Punjabi rule over our land, and provide the Baloch people with 
security, justice, and equality,” (Al Jazeera, 2012) suggesting a perceived disparity 
between the treatment of the rest of Pakistan and the Balochistan province. Balochistan is 
home to substantial energy and mineral reserves, fueling 36% of Pakistan’s energy needs 
(Khan, 2009). Despite this, the royalties returned to Balochistan are significantly less 
than those of Punjab and Sindh, which receive $1.65 and $2.35 per thousand cubic feet of 
gas supplied, respectively, compared to Balochistan’s $0.29 (Ullah and Ullah, 2017 & 
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Khan, 2009). In addition, only 4 out of 28 districts in Balochistan actually have 
availability to this gas (Khan, 2009). This discrepancy has been a persistent source of 
tension for Balochis, who feel they are not only being treated unfairly by the central 
government, but as former Balochistan cabinet minister Hussain Ashraf put it, feel that 
“they want to eliminate us” (Khan, 2009, p. 1080). Perceived resource exploitation is a 
factor that continues to fuel resentment towards the central government, feeding into the 
sentiment of colonization that allows insurgents to thrive from such civilian grievance. 
Another contention for the resurgent violence is the case of Gwadar. In Gwadar, 
via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project (CPEC), the central government has, 
with Chinese investments, allowed the building of a port with the desire to turn Gwadar 
into an international shipping hub. The initial announcement of the project did not 
resonate well with many Baloch residents, who felt that none of the benefits would flow 
to the province. With the project over a decade underway, it has still failed to gain any 
local support. Indeed, an interview with a fisherman describes how the Baloch feel 
disillusioned by any government assurances of mutual prosperity: “They promised jobs 
for all of Gwadar’s unemployed people….But the residents here are still unemployed. 
Some have college degrees, but none of them have jobs” (Al Jazeera, 2012). Instead, the 
project has brought a wave of Chinese workers into Balochistan, where many locals 
worry that the influx of foreigners will cause a major demographic change, turning 
residents into a minority (ICG, 2006; Grare, 2013; Mazhar et al, 2012). For Balochistan, 
the Gwadar port has increased tensions rather than alleviate any of the socio-economic 
problems. 
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Gwadar also symbolizes the lack of Baloch representation in economic projects—
when then-President Musharraf signed off on the project with China on March 24th, 
2002, he failed to include any Baloch representative (Khan, 2009). The land used for the 
project was sold off at superficially low rates for development under government land-
grabbing schemes that exploited residents’ inability to provide official land-ownership 
documentation (Khan, 2009). This scheme intensified the sentiment of occupation, and 
has thus presented the port as a megaproject orchestrated for the benefit of the central 
government, where Baloch residents see Gwadar as an emblem of colonization. 
Furthermore, within close proximity of the port, author Adeel Khan describes a “parallel 
town” with elite amenities intended for settlers and tourists, blocked off by paramilitary 
checkpoints that deny entrance to locals (Khan, 2009). Within the city of Gwadar itself, 
there remain signs of serious underdevelopment, and the port has brought more problems 
than success to the residents, as recounted by a high city official: “Gwadar land has been 
allocated to the personnel of military and civil bureaucracy. As if that was not enough, 
now people of the old Gwadar town are threatened [with having] to leave their ancestral 
land and move elsewhere” (Khan, 2009, p. 1080). Along with provincial autonomy and 
economic exploitation, the issues surrounding Gwadar have made up a crucial aspect of 
the grievances that allow the insurgents to gain legitimacy among the Baloch population. 
Furthering this legitimacy is the government’s rejection of these grievances. To put the 
Balochistan case in perspective, insurgency research suggests that governments that 
acknowledge local grievances are more likely to win an insurgency (Connable & Libicki, 
2010), and the people of Balochistan feel that their grievances have never been 
addressed. 
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The government's tactical response to the insurgents is another reason as to why 
the conflict persists. The repression and perceived brutality of the state’s insurgency 
tactics are central to augmenting and maintaining support for the insurgent cause among 
the population. The persistent military response to what is largely viewed as a political 
problem has only made the province more violent and radicalized according to research, 
and the amount of people who view the military as the main hurdle to peace has increased 
(ICG, 2006 & Grare, 2013). Military and intelligence operations have often included 
kidnappings and torture to suspected sympathizers, and indiscriminate attacks (ICG, 
2006). These tactics alone have incited protests and anger, and are factors that insurgency 
trend literature argue are more likely to garner insurgent support, creating perceptions of 
injustice and vengeance among civilians (Connable & Libicki, 2010; Lynn, 2005). In 
fact, some scholarship points to this repression by the state as the main driver of 
radicalization among nationalists; even outside of nationalist groups, the state’s brutality 
during the insurgency has accrued sympathizers, who see the state as responsible for the 
inciting the insurgency (Grare, 2013). In some cities such as Quetta, protesters mostly 
made up of young women have lined the streets in outrage of the murders and 
disappearances of their brothers and fathers through state intelligence operations. Most of 
the disappeared, who’s bodies end up dumped on the side of roads weeks, months, or 
years later, are civilians (Al Jazeera, 2013). One Baloch leader describes it as such: “The 
army and intelligence agents kidnap them and we know nothing about them for years. 
The Baloch people live in a state of war” (Al Jazeera, 2013). In addition to the forced 
disappearances, the military operations have also resulted in massive displacements of 
Baloch residents (ICG, 2006; Khan, 2009). These activities have culminated in outrage 
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among civilians, alienating the population from the side of the central government due to 
injustice and lack of security guarantee. 
The current insurgency also holds markedly different aspects from the past 
insurgencies. While the grievances are essentially the same, the tactics, demographics, 
and geography of the insurgency have fundamentally shifted. Whereas in the past, the 
insurgencies held tribal affiliations and were often led by tribal leaders, today the 
insurgency is led by a vibrant and ever-expanding middle class (Khan, 2009; Grare, 
2013; ICG, 2006). While many tribal leaders, including those of the Bugti, Marri, and 
Mengal tribes6 support the Balochistan Liberation Army, for example, the BLA does not 
belong to and is not lead by either tribe (Grare, 2013). Because the leaders of the ethno-
nationalist movement are an educated middle class, this has further resulted in two 
essential differences: first, it has inhibited inter-tribal clashes, as the insurgent groups are 
not owned by sardars which thus eliminates tribal competition (Khan, 2009). Second, it 
has shifted the geography of the movement from rural areas to urban, and from the 
northeast to the southwest (Grare, 2013). Indeed, author Robert Wirsing’s research from 
2008 suggests that “severe alienation from the Pakistan state was spreading rapidly to the 
province’s urban areas and to growing numbers of educated Baloch youths” effectively 
transforming the conflict into a wider movement (Wirsing, 2008). This change suggests a 
much broader support base than in the past, as it includes an entire class of population as 
opposed to the major stakeholders in the province (sardars). Now, any compromises or 
settlements to the conflict must involve the participation of at least an entire class of the 
population. In contrast, while the majority of scholarship indicates greater unity among 
                                                
6 The Bugti, Marri, and Mengal tribes are the three most prominent tribes in Balochistan, often holding 
political positions and affiliations in the provincial government. 
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the various insurgent groups, other literature suggests that it may be the contrary: the 
goals and tactics are fractured (Kupecz, 2012). Ultimately, the isolation of the 
Balochistan conflict makes it difficult to determine concrete evidence of insurgent 
movements. 
The demographic shift in the current insurgency has also unveiled a change in 
tactics and ability for insurgents to wage war. First, because the leaders are not only just 
tribal chiefs, it has made them elusive to the state. Despite allegations, the government 
has failed to prove any suspicions on the leaders (Al Jazeera, 2013), indicating a lack of 
effective intelligence— a critical factor in insurgency success (Connable & Libicki, 2010; 
Lynn 2005). In fact, insurgent leaders have capitalized on secrecy as a central strategy for 
remaining undefeated. They wage war in a decentralized system, utilizing multiple 
groups and leaders. Like one Baloch leader explained, “We don’t want to have a 
command centre. The experience of the Tamil Tigers was a vital lesson. The Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka became like an official army…. They lost everything after years of 
fighting” (Al Jazeera, 2013). The ongoing insurgency reflects a system in which the 
insurgents have prepared for a long and asymmetric war. Intelligence is perhaps the most 
critical asset of counterinsurgents, and consolidating the advantage of secrecy has proved 
effective in eluding the state and turning civilians against the government through their 
operations of kidnapping and indiscriminate attacks. This tactic is also reinforced with a 
new accessibility to weapons, which is a result of the Mujahideen and the porous border 
with Afghanistan (Khan, 2009). Baloch insurgents today are not only better equipped, but 
better organized to evade state attacks. 
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While the Balochistan insurgency has had some spilling across borders, and some 
indications of external involvement, the literature on whether the insurgents are receiving 
foreign aid is split. Some scholars insist that the insurgents are receiving foreign aid or 
are very likely to be receiving foreign aid (Bansal, 2008; Mazahar et al. 2012; Javaid & 
Jahangir, 2015). While these authors are not able to provide concrete evidence that 
directly affirms the assertion of external aid, a common reason for suspicion of the fact is 
the advanced weapons and training of the Baloch leaders, particularly the BLA (Bansal, 
2008; Javaid & Jahangir, 2015). Bansal puts the monthly estimated cost of the BLA 
(citing figures of 40 to 90 million rupees) as one reason indicative of foreign support 
(Bansal, P. 191, 2008). While the central government believes that Baloch rebels are 
receiving foreign support, particularly through India, with the exception of the occasional 
pro-Baloch comment or condemning of Pakistan’s handling of the crisis, there remains an 
absence of hard evidence (ICG, 2013). Substantial literature suggests that even despite 
foreign interests in the insurgency, there has been no concrete evidence of external aid to 
the insurgents (Chandran, 2006; Wirsing, 2008; Grare, 2013). In the Al Jazeera 
documentary, a Baloch leader insisted that they received no foreign aid, but were 
welcome to accepting any (Al Jazeera, 2013). External support, however, does have 
implications regarding the length and success of insurgency, as mentioned in the previous 
section. While insurgents deny that they have been given any foreign support, the state 
has frequently accused India of supporting the rebellion in Balochistan (Bhattacharjee, 
2015). Whether insurgents are receiving external support or not, if the military perceives 
interference from India, this too can have drastic consequences, suggesting a greater 
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allocation of military resources and attention to Balochistan in response to an India-
centric threat perception. 
At the core of the ethno-nationalist struggle is the deep-rooted and shared identity 
among the Baloch people. The grievances and conflict causes above have only served to 
reinforce this identity, and further separate the Baloch people from Pakistan. Like the 
Baloch leader who described the need for a lack of command centre described above, 
“Perhaps later we may unify our command since we are one ethnic group. We fight to 
free our people” (Al Jazeera, 2013). Even despite the multigroup-movement and lack of 
direct communications, the ethno-nationalist movement encompasses a shared identity as 
the basis for fighting. Many feel that Balochistan is an occupied territory, and for decades 
locals have fought for greater autonomy, only achieving province status in 1970. Balochis 
feel that their land has been exploited and their people marginalized, and thus this 
dynamic has become part of the Baloch struggle, and invigorated a desire for 
independence. Indeed, Baloch residents and political figures have alluded to the 
relationship between Pakistan and Balochistan as one of the colonizers and colonized 
(ICG, 2006). In fact, even Baloch politics are linked to maintaining the ethnic identity: 
they are secular rather than religious, because the Baloch people “have never felt a threat 
to their religious beliefs,” but their ethnic identity is constantly under threat, and therefore 
a secular system, by allowing a nationalist representation, is more unifying to the ethnic 
identity (Khan, P. 1083, 2009). Religion, while an integral part of Baloch life, does not 
manifest in the politics like the rest of Pakistan, because Islam is not under threat from 
the central government, the perceived “enemy” of most Baloch. Author Farhan Siddiqi 
similarly acknowledges that the dominance of the Punjabis in Islamabad “tended to deny 
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the existence and identity of peripheral groups such as the Baloch and Sindhis” (Siddiqi, 
P. 42, 2012). The rigged elections of 2002 were perhaps another direct reason for raising 
tensions for the insurgent movement: the military attempted at bringing Islamic-based 
parties to power over the popular nationalist ones, in another effort to crush Baloch 
nationalism (Grare, 2013). The importance of the Baloch identity is intertwined in nearly 
every aspect of Baloch life— from politics to insurgency. As tribal leader Nawab Khair 
Baksh Marri argues, “We are more Baloch than Pakistani” (Al Jazeera, 2012). 
2.3 Theoretical Argument 
The literature on Balochistan is rather limited, often contradictory, and unreliable, 
encompassing a variety of perspectives regarding the conflict. Common themes include 
provincial autonomy and Baloch representation, economic exploitation, military tactics, 
Gwadar, and contrasts between the past and current insurgencies. A consistent underlying 
theme among Baloch literature appears to be the importance of the ethnic Baloch identity, 
reinforced throughout time by shared grievances and alienation from the rest of Pakistan. 
The Baloch identity, amplified by the chronic grievances of the people, has led to the 
failure of the Baloch population to successfully integrate into Pakistan. This distinct 
identity allows the insurgents to push for a separatist agenda, as it provides an insurgency 
cause favorable to people in which they hope to mobilize for support. A cause that serves 
the interest of the people is necessary for gaining a support base (Galula, P. 45, 2010; 
Trinquier, P. 49, 1985; Mao & Griffith, 1989). 
Furthermore, given the scholarship on insurgencies, research and analysis on 
insurgency trends suggest securing popular support is critical to an insurgent’s success. 
Based on this literature highlighting the importance of popular support in sustaining an 
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insurgency, the following hypothesis is proposed: The protraction of the Balochistan 
Insurgency is the result of increased and sustained popular support among the insurgents. 
Popular support is the epicenter of attaining critical assets, such as intelligence, 
sanctuary, resources, and manpower that allow forces to persist. This hypothesis 
considers that the current insurgency is marked by a broader and larger movement than in 
the past, attracting far greater support, in explaining the endurance of the insurgency.  
While such literature also suggested that external support is another major factor 
in sustaining an insurgency, the contradictory reports found in preliminary Balochistan 
literature on whether the insurgents were receiving external aid or not, and the non-
transparent conditions within Pakistan, would make this variable difficult to measure. 
Therefore, an attempt to evaluate whether foreign intervention plays a role in the conflict 
will be made in the research, however, given the fractured consensus already present in 
literature, this factor will serve as an indicator for insurgency endurance. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
 
The research for this project includes examining many factors. It is compiled into 
sections: Economic Data, CT Operations/Human Rights Abuses, Nature of Insurgent 
Targeting, Insurgency Evolution: Gwadar & Current and Past Insurgencies, and External 
Support.  
First, economic data is gathered. This is in order to address possible defense 
spending increases or decreases in Balochistan by the Central Government, the reality of 
the underdevelopment situation, and Balochistan’s share of national GDP within relevant 
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sectors, such as energy and mining. This research will suggest two things: first, it will 
inform the reality of the grievances related to economic underdevelopment and economic 
discrimination. It will address whether the economic situation in Balochistan has 
improved, stagnated, or worsened. It will attempt to address the reach of these economic 
grievances as well. These factors help inform the extent to which the population of 
Balochistan has been impacted by sustained grievances, which in turn holds implications 
for insurgent support levels. Continued grievances alienate a population and supply the 
insurgency cause, after all. Pre-Existing Grievances, while part of the insurgency cause, 
holds implications for insurgency resilience, as insurgent literature suggests that in 
insurgencies where governments do not address local grievances, the government has a 
lower chance of winning the insurgency, making the insurgency longer and more 
complicated (Connable & Libicki, 2010). Therefore, the cause of an insurgency does 
matter in its explaining insurgency resilience. 
CT Operations/Human Rights Abuses, similarly, holds implications for whether 
the central government is alienating a population, or whether the insurgents are doing so. 
Indiscriminate attacks that impact civilians, as preliminary research states, lower the level 
of support for the side using those tactics. Therefore, understanding where human rights 
abuses are occurring and by whom is indicative for evaluating population support. 
Nature of Insurgent Targeting addresses the insurgent attack targets in order to 
evaluate whether insurgents are conducting indiscriminate attacks. This section utilizes 
data recorded in the Global Terrorism Database. Insurgent attack data will show how 
active the insurgency is numerically, and what/who the insurgent actors are targeting, 
which holds indications for population support. 
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Insurgency Evolution: Gwadar & Current and Past Insurgencies will look at how 
the current insurgency differs from those of the past, in order to determine what factors 
may be contributing to the persistence of this insurgency. Gwadar is grouped into this 
category because the grievances related to the Gwadar port are unique to this insurgency, 
and preliminary research has strongly suggested this has impacted the current insurgency. 
This section will also look at data on whether the middle class is leading the insurgent 
groups over tribal leaders, Dawn news articles from the 1973-1977 insurgency, and other 
changes. 
The final section will attempt to address external support for the insurgency. This 
section utilizes news articles, actor statements, secondary sources, and evidence of 
attacks outside of Pakistan. External support increases the insurgent chance of outlasting 
counterinsurgents, and therefore is an important variable for attempting to explain the 
resilience of the current insurgency in Balochistan.  
This research is a qualitative analysis of the Balochistan insurgency. The temporal 
range for this study is 1973 to the present (2019), encompassing the last insurgency and 
the current one. The diagram below depicts the causal mechanism for the hypothesis, in 
which the independent variable, support, impacts the dependent variable, the endurance 
of the insurgency.  
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study is the endurance of the insurgency, which is 
defined as the insurgency length. This is measured by attack data from the Global 
Terrorism Database, which records the first claimed attack by a Baloch insurgent actor to 
be in 2004. The endurance is also informed by current news articles confirming the 
ongoing conflict within the province (GTD is only updated to 2017 data at the time of 
writing). 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable for this study is popular support, defined as the 
sympathy, tolerance, advocacy, or backing of the insurgent actor cause. This is measured 
through four indicators that are indicative of impacting popular support: Pre-Existing 
Grievances, CT Operations, Nature of Insurgent Targeting, Insurgency Evolution. These 
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variables are measured through an analysis of primary sources, such as documented 
interviews, articles, social media, and secondary sources. Following is the 
operationalization of these proxies: 
• The first indicator that effects the popular support is Pre-Existing 
Grievances, measured by an analysis of economic indicators. The data 
comes largely from an economic report from 1973 – 2000 on provincial 
GDP shares, and World Bank data. This variable contributes to 
understanding whether any improvements to the economic conditions in 
Balochistan were made following the 4th insurgency (1973-1977), and 
whether underdevelopment, economic discrimination, and exploitation 
continued to persist up until the commencement of the 5th insurgency.  
• The second indicator is human rights abuses/indiscriminate attacks by the 
central government forces, or CT Operations, measured by an analysis of 
investigations, testimonies, news articles, and academic sources. 
Evaluating the credibility of human rights abuses and/or indiscriminate 
attacks is a factor that insurgent literature suggests is an indicator of 
insurgent support levels. 
• The third indicator is Nature of Insurgent Targeting, measured through 
attack data from the Global Terrorism Database. Nature of Insurgent 
Targeting is measured to understand the current trajectory of the 
insurgency, the activity levels, and the insurgent actor targets. This 
indicator is indicative of support in measuring the level of indiscriminate 
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and discriminate attacks, and the unity of insurgent actor targets. Insurgent 
literature suggests these are factors that influence insurgency support.  
• The fourth indicator is Insurgency Evolution, which analyzes what has 
changed from the 1973-1977 insurgency. These factors involve middle 
class leadership and involvement, which is measured through primary 
source accounts, including documented interviews, social media posts, 
news articles, as well as secondary sources. The involvement of middle 
class leadership contributes both to the endurance of the insurgency and is 
indicative of higher support levels due to the involvement of an entire 
class as opposed to those with solely tribal affiliations. This variable also 
includes the implication of the cyber platform as a way of promoting the 
separatist message, and the new grievance of Gwadar Port. 
• The final indicator is External Support, defined as support provided to 
insurgents or counterinsurgents from foreign state actors or foreign non-
state actors. External support is measured through an analysis of 
secondary sources, primary source accounts, actor statements or political 
rhetoric, and news articles. This variable is not used as a measurement or 
indicator affecting support, but rather a variable that would affect 
insurgency length. 
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CHAPTER III: RESULTS 
3.1 Economic Data 
An economic data report by Dr. Kaiser Bengali and staff economist Mahpara 
Sadaqat provides information on province GDP and share throughout the years 1973 – 
2000. This data covers the timeframe of the last Balochistan insurgency, which took 
place from 1973 to 1977, and would then provide some insight into whether any of the 
economic grievances were addressed following the insurgency.  
According to the data,7 from the start of 1973, Balochistan’s share of national 
GDP was 4.5 percent. By comparison, Punjab was 52.7 percent, Sindh 31 percent, and 
the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) 11.7 percent. By 2000, however, 
Balochistan’s share had decreased to 3.7 percent, tying with Sindh with the largest 
decrease in share by percentage points (Bengali & Sadaqat, P. 46, 2005). It is important 
to note that Balochistan only encompasses 5 percent of Pakistan’s population, however. 
                                                
7 Data in this section, and used in the graphs, until noted otherwise is gathered from Dr. Kaiser Bengali and 
Mahpara Sadaqat’s report, which was provided by sources including “government ministries, departments, 
agencies, corporations, and other private entities,” as mentioned under “Acknowledgments” (P. 3, 2005). 
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Figure 1  
 
By per capita GDP, Balochistan started off in 1973 with a higher average than Punjab and 
NWFP, however by 2000, whereas all provinces drastically increased their per capita 
GDP, Balochistan’s essentially stagnated with only a marginal increase comparatively, 
from 3280 at constant factor cost in 1973 to 3433 in 2000 (Bengali & Sadaqat, P.47, 
2005).  
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Figure 2  
 
 
The report also breaks down the economic data by share of produced goods by province. 
This research will only look at those goods that are relevant to the Balochistan province, 
such as mining/quarrying and electricity and gas. In the mining/quarrying data (P. 54), 
Balochistan went from supplying a 31.5 percent GDP share in 1973 to merely 10.9 
percent in 2000. The share difference appears to go towards Sindh and NWFP, in part 
because new natural resource deposits were discovered in these provinces (particularly 
Sindh) during this time. Under electricity/gas economic data, Balochistan only accounted 
for 3 percent of GDP share in 1973, only marginally increasing to 3.9 percent in 2000. 
Yet, Balochistan supplies 36% of the national energy needs, perhaps reflecting a 
disproportionate GDP share in this sector. Indeed, preliminary research notes that the gas 
royalties returned to Balochistan were far less than those of Punjab and Sindh ($1.65 and 
$2.35 per thousand cubic feet of gas supplied respectively, whereas Balochistan only 
received $0.29); this was in part due to the fact that Balochistan’s resources were 
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discovered earlier and negotiated at unfavorable terms before Balochistan even achieved 
province status in 1970 (Ullah & Ullah, 2017; Khan, 2009). It is important to note that 
this report only provides provincial GDP data and not an analysis of what factors 
produced that data and/or changes. These results, nevertheless, suggest some level of 
economic inequality between Balochistan and other provinces, especially Punjab and 
Sindh. In fact, the authors conclude that “on the whole, Balochistan appears – at best – to 
remain trapped in a low level equilibrium and – at worst – regressing further into under-
development” (Bengali & Sadaqat, P. 75, 2005). 
 Current articles also suggest a development constraint on the province. Last year 
(2018), the 2018-2019 budget presented by Adviser to the Balochistan Chief Minister on 
Finance, Dr. Ruqayya Saeed Hashmi, confirmed a funding gap of Rs61.9 billion for its 
development plans, the equivalent of over 442 million US dollars (Shahid & Jamal, 
2018). World Bank data also provides information on Balochistan’s economic situation, 
noting an array of issues: aside from Balochistan holding the largest poverty ratio of the 
provinces, its development has been significantly hampered by a lack of structural and 
planning considerations (World Bank, P.7-10, 2018). For instance, there is insufficient 
movement on a provincial growth strategy, the entire development planning sector is 
flawed in its process and evaluation of financial feasibility, there is no coherent strategy 
for transferring funds within the province, and there is a lack of coordination between the 
province and district in development projects (World Bank, P.7-10, 2018).8 This 
economic data corroborates much of the preliminary and current research on 
                                                
8 For a more comprehensive and in-depth assessment, see Balochistan, Pakistan Strengthening Budget 
Management to Improve Education Service Delivery (pp. 1-38, Rep.). (2018). Washington DC: World 
Bank Group. 
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Balochistan’s development situation, indicating significant strain in undergoing 
development projects. However, it also suggests that the underdevelopment issues are 
rooted in both provincial mismanagement, inequality related to GDP shares in certain 
sectors, and economic stagnation.  
Balochistan appears to continually be plagued with low growth, 
underdevelopment, and high poverty rates, which would suggest expansive economic-
related grievances throughout the province, regardless of whether the central government 
is at fault for the entirety of those grievances or not. In fact, the perception of 
discrimination and exploitation by the central government against Balochistan has been 
widely perceived by ordinary people, as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
(HRCP) states in their fact-finding mission report: 
 
It was however obvious that the people’s perceptions regarding discrimination 
against them by the federal government, notably an establishment that they saw as 
being dominated by the Punjab, had played a role in fomenting the deep sense of 
resentment and anger found in the province. These sentiments had significantly 
contributed to the new conflict. Citizens meeting the HRCP team also expressed 
the apprehension that the military wished to establish control over the vast natural 
resources of Balochistan. (HRCP, P. 2, 2006). 
 
 
 This research section also addresses internal security expenditure in Pakistan 
(where available) in order to inform both counterinsurgent power, as well as the long-
standing grievance of military presence in Balochistan. The HRCP noted that during their 
fact-finding mission, there were serious complaints about the expansive military presence 
in the area (HRCP, P.1, 2006). According to retired Pakistani General Talat Masood, in 
2017 there was a 10 percent increase in the army budget than in the previous year 
(Yusufzai, 2017). All provinces have had an increase in security force and law 
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enforcement expenditure of around 10 to 15 percent. Indeed, the spread of violence from 
the insurgency has demanded a greater security presence by the central government, thus 
prompting internal security increases in each subsequent year’s budget (Fazl-E-Haider, 
2015). An increase in internal security indicates a stronger state response to the 
insurgency and a greater state allocation of resources. This could also contribute to 
further resentment among Baloch people due to the already-expansive complaints on 
military presence in the province, coupled with the military’s bad relationship with the 
public. 
3.2 CT Operations/Human Rights Abuses 
The next section will investigate human rights abuses and state repression claims 
within Balochistan. This is a powerful factor for not only alienating a population, but in 
fact turning a population against authorities. A compiled list of twenty academic sources, 
reports, and articles noted human rights abuses, displacements, and/or forced 
disappearances by the central government’s Security Forces and Intelligence Services in 
Balochistan.9  
Some of the sources also determined human rights abuses by militants, tribes, and 
non-state actors (Fazl-E-Haider, 2015; HRCP, 2006; US Department of State, 2017). 
Many of those abuses by militants were generally towards Pashtun settlers however, and 
not the ethnic Baloch population (HRW, 2011); in fact, one report found that while on 
one hand, the military tactics had reduced the violence against the settlers, on the other, 
they supported the sustainment of the insurgency among the Baloch population (Fazl-E-
Haider, 2015). Abuses by tribes were alleged to also have taken place particularly in the 
                                                
9 Included in references. 
 36 
Bugti area, although this was denied by Nawab Akbar Bugti, the leader of the Bugti tribe 
(HRCP, P. 2, 2006). Ultimately, according to a report by the HRCP, credible and 
substantial evidence indicated that human rights abuses had taken place: 
 
There were alarming accounts of summary executions, some allegedly carried out 
by paramilitary forces. HRCP received credible evidence that showed such 
killings had indeed taken place. Across Balochistan, the HRCP team found 
widespread instances of ‘disappearance’, of torture inflicted on people held in 
custody and on those feeling from their house and hearth in fear. (HRCP, P. 2, 
2006). 
 
 
Throughout interviews within Balochistan (recorded in the Al Jazeera, 2013 
documentary), many Baloch also insisted on the credibility of such abuses; according to 
one Baloch local, “The army’s injustices here are unbelievable. The soldiers arrest poor 
people, steal their food and animals. They burn people alive and throw them in vats of 
boiling tar.” A Baloch leader interviewed by Al Jazeera echoed similar discontentment 
with the army: “The army and intelligence agents kidnap them and we know nothing 
about them for years…. They burn down our homes and then ask us for peace.” A report 
by the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) records a similar story: 
 
Security forces during their operations set fire to crops and looted valuables of the 
inhabitants. Such incidents took place in all parts of Balochistan and footages of 
these heinous human rights violation are present in social media uploaded by 
affected areas’ people and organizations and these acts are undeniable (VBMP, 
2016). 
 
 
Indeed, a Human Rights Watch report records multiple witness and victim 
accounts of such abuses and disappearances, with the youngest victim only 12 years old. 
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Of the 45 detailed cases, the HRW report evaluated, “None of the victims, their relatives 
or eyewitnesses to the alleged disappearances interviewed by Human Rights Watch 
blamed armed Baloch groups,” but rather operations connected to the central government 
(HRW, 2011). The results of such actions by the central government forces have affected 
mostly civilians. While the exact numbers of disappeared remains unknown, figures as 
high as 18,000 (Baloch/VBMP, 2014) and 15,000 (Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2014)10 
have been cited, with more conservative estimates at 10,000 (Ahmed, 2015; 
HRCP/Hadid, 2017; Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2014). These actions nevertheless 
have undoubtedly instilled further resentment among the Baloch population (Sareen, 
2010). 
Even regardless of who is to blame, it is clear that the ethnic Baloch people 
perceive the central government to be largely at fault for such abuses. Perhaps this, in 
part, can be explained by the HRCP finding that there remains a lack of accountability by 
the government for the abuses that have taken place, and the thousands that have been 
displaced due to violence (HRCP, P. 4, 2006). A UN statement on enforced 
disappearances also seems to uphold the validity of such actions (ICJ, 2016). In fact, 
some analysis from secondary sources suggests Islamabad’s responses to the current 
insurgency are far more brutal than the repression seen during in the 1970s (Wirsing, 
2008; Harrison, 2006). 
 The insurgents and counterinsurgents are locked in a battle over winning the 
support of the population. Indiscriminate attacks is a factor that influences which side 
will win the population support, as such attacks indicate a failure to protect the 
                                                
10 Written statement submitted to the United Nations by Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2014 
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population. This would especially impact the credibility of the central government, which 
is responsible for guaranteeing the safety of citizens (Lynn, P. 23, 2010). That these 
violations have taken place by the federal government against civilians also suggests an 
insufficiency of actionable intelligence. Going back to preliminary insurgent literature, 
the research argues that intelligence is significant in an insurgency because it is often 
difficult to visibly know the difference between insurgents and civilians. Therefore, 
intelligence is imperative in order to attack the correct targets and not alienate a 
population through unjust killings. The actions of the security forces and the results of the 
paramilitary operations suggest that, to some extent, the counterinsurgents do not have 
enough intelligence. As insurgency literature suggests, the population can provide 
substantial intelligence on insurgent movements, and therefore a cycle of alienation 
would further inhibit counterinsurgents from gaining intelligence from locals. 
Islamabad’s counterinsurgency operations have likely served to reinforce Baloch popular 
support for the insurgents. 
3.3 Nature of Insurgent Targetting 
This section of research provides data on the trajectory of the insurgency, the 
insurgent actors, and their targets. It attempts to showcase the movements of insurgents, 
inform some numerical data on the extent of violence and targets of insurgents, and 
depict what years have seen an increase in attacks. The attack count by insurgent groups 
is important because it suggests how active a group may be, and looking at the change in 
attacks over time provides insight into when the insurgency was most active, and if it is 
still at all active. Preliminary data suggest that attacks often target infrastructure, 
government personnel, and foreigners. The data in this section is from the Global 
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Terrorism Database,11 in which attack data pertaining to Baloch separatist groups has 
been isolated and represented in graphs.  
Figure 3 demonstrates Balochistan’s active separatist groups and their total attack 
count from the years 2002 to 2017 (although the first claimed attack was in 2004). 
According to such data, the Baloch Republican Army is the most active group based on 
attack number, followed by Baloch Liberation Front, Baloch Liberation Army, United 
Baloch Army, and then a few others. Figure 4 shows group lethality based on total 
number of people killed per group. 
                                                
11 For more information on GTD, see: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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Figure 3: Balochistan Insurgent Group Attack Counts 2002-2017 
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Figure 4: Balochistan Insurgent Group Total Number Killed  
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Figure 5: Balochistan Insurgent Group Total Numbers of Killed + Injured 
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Based on this data, despite that the Baloch Republican Army has launched 
significantly more attacks than its counterparts at 312 attacks, it is the Baloch Liberation 
Army that has been the most lethal group in terms of total numbers killed. It is important 
to remember that not all of the targets of the insurgent groups are designed to kill, but that 
many target infrastructure or utilities; according to preliminary research, these are 
perceived as signs of the central government’s encroachment. Indeed, data looking at the 
targets of insurgent groups found that that the Baloch Republican Army overwhelmingly 
targeted utilities in their attacks, with 140 of their attacks targeting utilities, whereas 
comparatively, the next highest was the United Baloch Army (19), and the Baloch 
Liberation Army (18). Conversely, the Baloch Liberation Front targeted the most 
government targets12 with 99 attacks towards government targets, followed by Baloch 
Republican Army (87), and Baloch Liberation Army (80). Data looking at civilian targets 
was comparatively low in claimed attacks, where the Baloch Liberation Front had the 
most attacks towards civilian targets (39), followed by Baloch Liberation Army (33). 
Here, it is significant to note that settlers in Balochistan have been targeted by insurgent 
groups, and therefore can count as civilian targets.  
Figure 6 below charts the top four most active insurgent groups and their targets, 
and the targets of unclaimed attacks, from 2002-2017. Figure 7 charts attacks from 1979-
2001 for a comparison of attack levels and attack targets prior to the insurgency. The 
results suggest that while civilian targets were low under claimed attacks, unclaimed 
attacks saw a higher proportion of civilian targets.13 Government targets still remained a 
                                                
12 Government targets were counted as Government (General), Police, Military, Government (Diplomatic) 
as per GTD Codebook 
13 There are a few reasons as to why some militant groups do not claim attacks, including: (1) some groups 
do not need to claim attacks to reach the target audience; (2) claiming attacks increases the targeting by 
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higher target count, however. Ultimately, the results indicate that insurgent groups that 
claimed their attacks claimed far fewer civilian target groups. A Human Right Watch 
report found that some insurgent groups, citing the BLA and BLUF as examples, claimed 
civilian attacks that were non-Baloch civilians (HRW, 2011). 
 
Attack Group Targets 2002-2017 Figure 6 
Group Name Total Attack # Utilities # Government # Civilians # 
BRA 312 140 87 13 
BLF 185 2 99 39 
BLA 181 18 80 33 
UBA 89 19 29 13 
Unclaimed 2,600 273 878 546 
 
Attack Group Targets 1979-2001 Figure 7 
Group Name Total Attack # Utilities # Government # Civilians # 
Claimed14 18 0 4 8 
Unclaimed 44 2 12 11 
Claimed + 
Unclaimed 
62 2 16 19 
 
 Figure 5 shows the total casualties by group, including both the death count and 
those injured. This data would perhaps suggest which groups are directly impacting the 
                                                                                                                                            
counterinsurgents; (3) if an attack is unsuccessful or kills unintended targets, insurgents may be uninclined 
to claim the attack; (4) if the response of the attack is ill-received by the insurgent support group, insurgents 
may not claim the attack. 
14 Claimed attacks are consolidated due to low-activity (and likely non-Baloch insurgent) groups: Pro-
Kabul Provocateurs, Political Group, Pathan Tribal Group, Sindhi nationalists, Tribal Group, Muslim 
Militants, Ittehad-i-Islami, Shia Muslim extremists, Kalpar Tribesmen, Kaka-Tribesmen, Tribesmen 
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most people. Here, the Baloch Republican Army has the highest number of casualties at 
798, followed closely by the Baloch Liberation Army at 789. The following graph 
(Figure 8 below), includes claimed and unclaimed attacks by year. Claimed attacks would 
include any attack from the insurgent groups listed in the earlier graphs. Unclaimed 
attacks are limited to include any attack within the boundaries of Balochistan: this means 
that there is a greater margin of error in whether every unclaimed attack is related to the 
Balochistan insurgency, and would not include attacks related to the insurgency outside 
of Balochistan (perhaps into a neighboring province or along the border with 
Afghanistan). Figure 9 similarly mimics the attack count pattern in representing 
casualties by year, with the exception that 2012 saw a disproportionately higher casualty 
count than the attack count would indicate.  
 This data allows for an interpretation of the trajectory of the Balochistan 
Insurgency. 2012 through 2014 seem to be the peak years of the insurgent activity, yet 
even in the following years, there is higher activity levels than the first seven years since 
the start of the insurgency. While this thesis does not attempt to explain the sudden rise in 
attacks, two prominent events that happened in Balochistan in 2013 include the May 
2013 Provincial Assembly elections, and a 7.7 magnitude earthquake in September that 
killed hundred in Balochistan. While GTD has not yet included updated data from 2018, 
news articles of recent attacks suggest continued activity.  
 For support levels, a lack of indiscriminate attacks would indicate higher support 
from the population. The focus of insurgent groups appears to be discriminate, targeting 
establishments that coincide with their cause, such as government and utility targets. A 
focus on targets that reflect local grievances has a better chance of gaining more support, 
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as suggested by insurgent literature. These results are indicative of increasing the 
likelihood of further popular support.  
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Figure 8: Balochistan Attack Counts Including Claimed and Unclaimed 
3 4
17
43
87
36
113
171
145
211
347
607
624
473
306
290
0
200
400
600
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Years
At
ta
ck
 C
ou
nt Variables
Claimed
Unclaimed
Total Attack Counts 2002 − 2017
Based on data from GTD
 48 
 
Figure 9: Casualty Count by Years 2002-2017 
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This research also looked at inter-group conflict. Preliminary insurgent research 
suggested that insurgencies with multiple actors tend to last longer, as it is more difficult 
to end an insurgency given competing interests of many groups (Connable & Libicki, 
2010). Conventional wisdom argues that when there are multiple actors competing for 
support, this would split the support pool due to outbidding between groups vying for 
support. However, a lack of inter-group conflict would suggest that this may not be the 
case. As mentioned by an insurgent leader, “Perhaps later we may unify our command 
since we are one ethnic group. We fight to free our people” (Aljazeera, 2012). This 
research found only one instance of inter-group conflict, in which the Baloch Liberation 
Army targeted the United Baloch Army on June 29th, 2015 in the Dera Bugti District. 
There was no other case in GTD data of a Baloch insurgent group targeting another, 
indicating that there may be a more unified separatist objective among all groups. 
Therefore, this insurgency may enjoy a much broader support base, given the lack of 
competing interests and outbidding among groups. This would also support the 
preliminary research findings that the insurgent groups are expanding to include leaders 
among the middle class, not solely tribal leaders. After all, tribal leaders tend to have 
separate and competing interests (as was the case in the previous insurgency). Unity 
among objectives and support in the insurgency could allow for increased credibility of 
the local grievances (Heinkel & DeVillafranca, p. 65, 2016). Fundamentally, these results 
suggest that there is greater unity, and therefore more likely to mobilize a broader support 
base. 
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3. 4 Insurgency Evolution: Gwadar & Current Insurgency and Past Insurgency 
Differences 
In analyzing why the current insurgency has outlasted the length of its 
predecessors, it is crucial to examine what makes the current one different. 
Unfortunately, some preliminary literature sources conflicted each other. If a middle 
class, as opposed to tribal sardars, is leading the ongoing insurgency, this would suggest a 
broader support base. Yet, as the preliminary research notes, some sources say that tribal 
leaders still lead the insurgent movement while others say it is the middle class. The 
implications of each are significant. 
To draw back from the previous section, an absence of inter-group targeting is 
indicative that tribal leaders are perhaps not the main force behind the current insurgency, 
given that tribes tend to clash. Selig Harrison’s analysis indicates the same— that the 
inability for Pakistan to attribute the insurgency to tribal conflict has been a unique 
marker of the current insurgency (Harrison, 2006). It is not to say that tribalism has no 
influence at all in Balochistan, however, like Grare notes in his research (Grare, 2013), 
even the killings of Akbar Bugti and Balach Marri did not stop the insurgency. On the 
contrary, the graphs in the previous section demonstrate a drastic increase in insurgent 
activity. A Dawn news article, among other sources, also confirms the presence of strong 
separatist support among the educated middle class through interviews with students and 
office-holders who are part of the Balochistan Student Organization— Azad (Ahmad, 
2012). In fact, one office-holder directly states, “Women and children, sardars and the 
common man... We stand together,” (Ahmad, 2012). The Bugtis and Marris are still 
popular leaders, however the members of the middle class have joined the ranks of the 
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most popular alongside them, creating an expansive and unified movement (Harrison, 
2006). Yet, some scholars suggest that while the movement has expanded to include 
more middle class involvement, there has also been increased friction between some 
elements of the middle class and tribal chiefs; despite this however, “the ballast for 
Baloch nationalism is coming from the middle-classes” (Sareen, 2010).  
Malik Siraj Akbar, editor of the banned online newspaper Baloch Hal, has also 
suggested that new supporters are fighting the conflict in Balochistan with the media, 
through online political activism using sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube; he 
argues that the central government has “equally engaged in a full-fledged battle with the 
Baloch media” (Ahmad, 2012). Indeed, Baloch Hal and the BSO-Azad are active on 
twitter, Facebook, and other news sources condemning the forced disappearances and 
extrajudicial killings in Balochistan. Media posts from the BSO-Azad Facebook page 
also encourage a Pro-Baloch separatist message. Days before the 27th of March of 2019, 
the BSO-Azad posted about promoting an online social media campaign on March Black 
Day (27th of March), the day when Balochistan lost its sovereignty to Pakistan. 
Referencing the Central Spokesperson Baloch Students Organization Azad (BSO-A) in a 
Facebook post, strong rhetoric illustrates the separatist message:  
 
“….observing 27th March as Black Day is an attempt to divert the 
attention of international community, international media and United States 
towards the state barbarism and is also aimed to aware them about the historical 
background of this forceful annexation of Pakistan—which is not accepted by 
Baloch nation in any condition” (BSO-Azad Facebook Page, 24th of March, 
2019). 
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It is not the only page of its kind. Other pages such as the Baloch National Movement 
(BNM) also support the cause, with postings both in English and Urdu. 
An academic paper by Abdul Iqbal also analyzed the impact on mobilization that 
this new medium of promoting the separatist agenda has had on the Balochistan 
insurgency. This study finds that social media has become a platform that is rapidly 
spreading the separatist message not just across Balochistan, but even reaching people 
outside Balochistan (Iqbal, P. 136, 2011). The author found an extensive list of Facebook 
pages in which the separatist ideology dominated most of them, and many had foreign 
fans in addition to domestic (Iqbal, P. 137-139, 2011). The use of online and media 
sources for mobilization is also a well-known tool for the educated middle class. Iqbal 
notes leadership in the insurgency with both the major tribal leaders and the middle class 
(Iqbal, P. 142, 2011).  Increased mobilization through social media would allow for a 
greater support base due to a greater population to become exposed to the message. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this section, the messages not only include some English 
language, but posts that directly target the international community. Moreover, it also 
allows a population to support insurgents without having to directly engage in militant 
activities. The middle-class support and leadership, in addition to the new platform of 
social media to project the separatist message, are developments unique to the current 
insurgency, both of which heavily encourage broad, domestic-level support. 
 The Gwadar port is another newfound grievance. Plans to make Gwadar a free 
port were mentioned in papers such as Dawn as early as 1973. Historically, Gwadar was 
bestowed to the Sultan of Oman by the Khan of Kalat, which it administered for nearly 
two centuries until September of 1958, when Pakistan reclaimed the land in a $3 million-
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dollar deal (Kanwal, 2018). The potential to turn the rural fishing village into a deep-
water port was discovered in 1954 through the US Geological Survey (Harris, 2019). 
More surveys were undertaken to determine the viability of a port in the location even 
during the 1970s (Dawn Archives, 1973). Actual construction did not begin until 2002, as 
a Chinese investment project. Gwadar has been mentioned frequently as a new source of 
grievance among the Baloch population, especially given the Chinese presence in 
Gwadar due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. Insurgents have targeted 
the Chinese presence in Balochistan as well, affirming the sentiment among the militant 
actors through attacks such as the November 23rd Chinese consulate attack (Ahmad & 
Masood, 2018) or the August attack on a bus carrying Chinese workers (Yousafzai 2018). 
 It has been confirmed through many sources that the Baloch perspective on the 
Gwadar Port is negative and seen to have little benefit for the local population (Al 
Jazeera, 2012; ICG, 2006; Grare, 2013; Khan 2009; VBMP, 2016). What is more, the 
profitability of Gwadar is questionable from an economic standpoint as well: a study by 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that the Gwadar Port was one of 
the Belt and Road developments that faced significant profitability challenges given its 
lack of “connectivity to the hinterland,” one of the criteria the report uses to assess 
economic challenges (Funaiole & Hillman, P. 4, 2018). In fact, the locals in Gwadar have 
suffered detriment as the result of the project. Not only has unemployment among many 
educated workers been an issue (Al Jazeera, 2012), but other accounts from the Voice of 
the Baloch Missing Persons describe how life has been increasingly difficult in Gwadar: 
 
“….in the town of Gawadar local people are given a card, where out-siders 
cannot get in to the city, while insiders cannot move somewhere out of the city 
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without the permission of security agencies after a painful process. The areas’ 
socio-economy is based on fishing, but fishermen are also stopped from 
autonomously moving into deep sea for all time except limited hours. In this way, 
the area’s people are effected the worst by Gawadar port which is given to 
Chinese” (VBMP, 2016). 
 
 
While it is clear that Gwadar holds geostrategic implications for China and Pakistan 
against India, if the port cannot produce any profitable benefit for the people of 
Balochistan, even the long-term outcome could sustain grievances. 
Ultimately, the current insurgency has manifested itself in a unique way from 
previous conflicts, while still retaining deep-rooted grievances. Critical differences in 
leadership and support, the role of social media, and Gwadar are some of the key 
contrasts among the current insurgency from the previous one that are indicative of 
greater popular support. These factors have served to either broaden population support 
of insurgency, project the separatist message, or incite new grievances, all of which hold 
implications to impacting insurgent support.  
3. 5 External Support 
The final variable that this research attempts to evaluate is external support. 
External support holds implications for an insurgent’s ability to outlast and endure. This 
project must then dedicate some analysis to whether this may be a factor in the current 
Balochistan Insurgency. As mentioned in the preliminary research, the consensus on 
whether insurgents are receiving foreign aid is fractured. Many authors believe that the 
insurgents are receiving some form of foreign aid (Bansal, 2008; Mazahar et al. 2012; 
Javaid & Jahangir, 2015), whereas others find a lack of hard evidence on this case (ICG, 
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2013; Chandran, 2006; Wirsing, 2008; Grare, 2013). This research will analyze news 
articles and political rhetoric to attempt to inform this variable, as the implication for 
insurgency length are significant. 
Islamabad’s main suspicions and blames for external support towards the Baloch 
insurgents is with India. Indian prime minster Narenda Modi and India’s ambassador to 
the UN have made statements condemning the central government’s actions in 
Balochistan. In September of 2016, India’s permanent representative to the UN declared 
that “This is a country (Pakistan), which has systematically abused and violated the 
human rights of its own citizens, including in Balochistan,” marking the first time that 
India has brought up the issue to the UN (Balachandran, 2016). Indian Prime Minister 
Modi also mentioned Balochistan in his Independence Day speech (Haidar, 2016). 
Perhaps more concerning was the case of an alleged Indian spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav, who 
was arrested near the Iran-Balochistan border in 2016 by the ISI, with some reports 
linking him to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of its intelligence. In a story 
published on an Indian news outlet, The Quint, which was later deleted (although an 
archived copy remains), claims of multiple RAW sources referred to Jadhav as “not a 
high-grade operative,” with ambiguity surrounding his reasons for being in Balochistan 
(Nandy, 2018). It does not seem that Jadhav was providing aid or supporting the 
insurgency, however. It is important to note that India likely has strategic interests in 
gaining intelligence on Chinese activity within Balochistan, given that China has 
emerged as India’s rival, and most Chinese investments are taking place in Balochistan. 
This means that while India may not necessarily be backing the insurgency, there is an 
incentive to be in Balochistan. 
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Regarding Afghanistan, there have been allegations on Indian involvement in 
training Baloch separatist groups and supplying material aid from within Afghanistan 
(Weinstein, 2017), yet these remain allegations. Ultimately, aside from political rhetoric, 
there is a lack of evidence proving any external involvement, and therefore no position 
can be made regarding the variable of external support for this research. Not enough 
credible information is available to make a decision on whether external support is a real 
factor in the current insurgency, despite that there is a real possibility of external 
involvement. 
 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The Balochistan Insurgency is a complicated conflict with many dimensions. As 
is perhaps evident from this paper, the insurgency has also been rapidly evolving even 
while containing many of the same grievances as past conflicts. The findings of this 
paper seem to support the hypothesis that increased support has driven the current 
insurgency’s resilience. After all, a central evolution of this conflict is the fact that it is 
broader and more expansive, indicative of a robust support base. This research suggests 
that support has increased through new channels, in addition to the continued existence of 
former grievances.  
That the leadership is held by the middle class is crucial to suggesting greater 
support. Unlike past insurgencies, which were largely lead by only tribal leaders, a 
middle class is more unified with a common goal. Tribal leaders often held competing 
interests, and therefore the actions and support for the past insurgencies were often 
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fractured along tribal lines. This no longer appears to be the case. Similarly, the second 
point that suggests increased support is the lack of inter-group conflict. GTD data showed 
no sign of fighting between separatist groups with the exception of one attack. This is 
indicative of a unified goal, and supportive of the likelihood of middle class leadership. It 
also suggests that the separatist groups are not attempting to outbid each other to compete 
for popular support. A lack of competition would create a wider support base for the 
separatist groups and some level of unification surrounding the cause. A further point is 
the new medium of social media for spreading the insurgent movement, both 
domestically and internationally. This would not only connect and reinforce 
sympathizers, but encourage greater support for the insurgent cause. The Gwadar Port is 
a new and urbanized grievance that has also contributed to the sentiment of colonization, 
and therefore amounts to an additional complaint affecting the urban area’s population. 
These factors are particularly unique to the current insurgency, and yet all past grievances 
have also remained unchanged. This research found validity in both the economic 
grievances and the human rights abuse grievances that further instilled animosity towards 
the government, which insurgency literature suggests is more likely to lead to greater 
insurgent support.  
The factors that have set this insurgency apart from its predecessors, and the 
factors that have not (in other words, those grievances that still plague the Baloch 
population), both suggest that the insurgents have reached greater support levels. These 
factors— pre-existing grievances, CT Operations/Human Rights Abuse, Nature of 
Insurgent Targeting, and Insurgency Evolution — are indicative of such outcomes based 
on insurgency trends. Governments that do not address the grievances of a population are 
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more likely to alienate that population. Similarly, operations and tactics that result in 
indiscriminate attacks and abuses against civilians would also result in alienation. The 
attack targets of separatist actors were largely discriminate, and lacked inter-group 
conflict, suggesting that the group targets represent the separatist cause, and there exists 
greater unification. Lastly, an expansive middle class involvement, separatist media 
campaign, and the additional grievances of Gwadar, all contribute to indicating greater 
popular support levels among the insurgent cause. While there may be no definitive 
marker for predicting an insurgency, and there is scarcely ever one explanation for such 
conflicts, this research perhaps can contribute a greater understanding into the factors at 
play within the ongoing insurgency. Increased popular support appears to be a 
contributing factor to the Balochistan Insurgency endurance. 
4. 1 Limitations 
• This research encountered a few limitations. First, the more evident limitations 
are those concerned with transparency and reliability of information. Pakistan is 
not a transparent country, and is frequently plagued with disinformation and 
propaganda. Therefore, this issue limited the amount of news sources that could 
credibly be used. There also remains the likelihood of substantial information that 
is not available which would have significant implications for this thesis. 
• On a similar note, another limitation was the differences in the quality of data. 
The variables CT Operations and Nature of Insurgent Targeting were essentially 
measuring similar aspects of support— both were evaluating indiscriminate 
attacks to inform population alienation. The data provided by the Global 
Terrorism Database, however, is far more concrete and substantial, providing 
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more information on the attack, and including all recorded attacks. In evaluating 
the CT Operations, this data is not available in the same manner as the GTD. In 
fact, most of the information on the attacks by the central government include 
only those that were indiscriminate and involved human rights abuses, as they are 
made up of reports, investigations, interviews, and testimonies.  
• A third limitation was the evolution of the insurgency, and the contradictions and 
conflicting assertions of sources. The current Balochistan Insurgency has been 
ongoing for over fifteen years, and therefore has likely evolved. Unfortunately, 
there is absence of substantial literature on Balochistan, and much of this 
literature does not take into account how the insurgency has changed throughout 
years. The case in 2006 has changed from the case in 2014: GTD data proves that 
the trajectory has had drastic rises in attacks, as well as declines. This also effects 
the assertions and claims of sources, which often directly clashed. 
4.2 Final Remarks 
The implications of this research to the geopolitics of the region are continued 
destabilization risks within the province if the grievances and issues of the Baloch people 
are not just acknowledged by the central government, but addressed. This is not 
necessarily a new realization, however; this has been the case for the past insurgencies. 
Yet, this research has unique implications concerning how the central establishment will 
likely need to address these issues. Due to the indications of a broader support base 
fueling the current insurgency, Islamabad will likely need to appeal to the entire Baloch 
population to see any reconciliation and decreased volatility. In the past, the central 
government was able to play off tribal feuds as driving the insurgency, and strike deals 
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with the tribes in order to bring about an end to the militancy— this situation will likely 
no longer be the case. Islamabad will have to concede some responsibility for the 
grievances of the people in order to see a long-term decrease in violence and conflict. It is 
unlikely that insurgents will see an independent Balochistan; the success rate of violent 
insurgencies is low, and the longer an insurgency lasts, the more likely government 
forces will overtake the insurgents (Connable & Libicki, 2010). Even if the insurgency 
will soon decline, history proves that it is unlikely to be a long-term end, however. The 
following actions are steps that would aid in repairing relations between the Baloch 
people and the central establishment: 
• Increasing provincial autonomy and accepting a secular provincial 
government  
• More transparency in National-Provincial projects and economic deals 
• Provincial participation and input on CPEC projects within the province, 
especially Gwadar Port 
• Address the cases of enforced disappearances and human rights abuses, 
and provide the identities of those disappeared and found dead without 
identification, in addition to halting such operations 
• Improve communications between Islamabad and Quetta 
 
The challenge today is not only ending the violence by militants, but also repairing the 
long-standing issues and troubled relationship between the people of Balochistan and 
Islamabad. Even if the Security Forces are able to crush the insurgency today, tomorrow, 
or next week, without real changes between this relationship, we are likely to see another 
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similar insurgency arise in Balochistan in the future. This research suggests that the 
conflict today involves a broader population, and therefore the situation in Balochistan is 
perhaps getting worse, not better. In an age of modernization, technology, and 
globalization, a worsening conflict is likely to have greater costs and risks in the future, 
and therefore it is imperative that Islamabad makes some changes to the status quo 
situation in Balochistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
REFERENCES 
Administrator. About Balochistan - Government of Balochistan. Accessed October 01, 
2018. 
https://www.Balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=37&Itemid=783. 
 
 
Ahmad, A. (1973). The National Question in Balochistan. Pakistan Forum, 3(8/9), 4-37. 
doi:10.2307/2569087. 
 
  
Ahmad, M. (2012, June 05). Balochistan: Middle-class rebellion. Retrieved from 
https://www.dawn.com/news/723987. 
 
  
Al Jazeera World. (2012, January). Balochistan: Pakistan's other war [Documentary]. 
 
 
Amnesty International Ltd. (2018). PAKISTAN 2017/2018.  
 
 
Balachandran, M. (2016, September 16). Balochistan is now officially an arrow in India's 
quiver against Pakistan. Retrieved from https://qz.com/india/782147/narendra-
modis-message-to-the-un-Balochistan-is-now-officially-an-arrow-in-indias-
quiver-against-pakistan/ 
 
 
Baloch, M. B. (2014, July 16). Judicial Commission's Report on Mass Graves in 
Balochistan. Retrieved from https://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/mass-graves-
Balochistan-346/ 
 
 
"BALOCHISTAN." Hilal, November 30, 2013. Infotrac Newsstand (accessed October 1, 
2018). 
http://link.galegroup.com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/apps/doc/A353399754/STND?u
=maine_orono&sid=STND&xid=6cc67fa3. 
 
 
Bansal, Alok. "Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan." Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (2008): 182-200. Accessed September 6, 2018. 
doi:10.1080/09592310802061356. 
 
 
 63 
Bengali, K., & Sadaqat, M. (2005). Regional accounts of Pakistan: Methodology and 
estimates,1973-2000. Karachi: Social Policy and Development Centre. 
 
 
Bhattacharjee, D. (2015). Pakistan's India Fixation on the Issue of Balochistan. 
 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 1986. 
 
 
Chandran, D. S. (2006). Akbar Bugti and After: Implications for Balochistan and 
Pakistan. IPCS Issue Brief, (38). 
 
 
Chawla, Muhammad Iqbal. "MOUNTBATTEN AND BALOCHISTAN: AN 
APPRAISAL." Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 75 (2014): 928-57. 
 
 
"Conflict in Balochistan: natural resources and the way forward." Strategic Studies 33, 
no. 3-4 (2013). Academic OneFile (accessed September 15, 2018). 
 
 
Connable, Ben, and Martin C. Libicki. How Insurgencies End. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2010. 
 
 
Dabas, M. (2017, June 23). Here Is All You Should Know About 'String Of Pearls', 
China's Policy To Encircle India. 
 
 
Dashti, Naseer. Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the 
Fall of the Baloch State. Place of Publication Not Identified: Trafford On Demand 
Pub, 2012. 
 
 
Enforced disappearances in Pakistan: UN statement. (2016). 
Oral Statement of the International Commission of Jurists, supported by Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, in the Interactive Dialogue with the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. 
 
  
Fazl-E-Haider, S. (2015). Security Challenges for Balochistan in 2015. Pakistan & Gulf 
Economist, 33(52), 12. 
 
 
 64 
Funaiole, M., & Hillman, J. (2018). China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic 
Drivers and Challenges (CSIS Briefs, pp. 1-6, Rep.). Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
 
 
Galula, D., & Nagl, J. A. (2010). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New 
Delhi: Pentagon Press. 
 
 
Grare, F. (2013, April). Balochistan The State Versus the Nation. Retrieved February 4, 
2019, from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Balochistan.pdf 
 
 
Guevara, C. (2006). Guerrilla warfare: Authorized edition. New York: Ocean Press. 
 
 
Hadid, D. (2017). Concern grows in pakistan over cases of disappearance. Washington: 
NPR.  
 
 
Haidar, S. (2016, September 20). In policy shift, Narendra Modi brings up Balochistan 
again. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/In-policy-shift-
Narendra-Modi-brings-up-Balochistan-again/article14572650.ece 
 
 
Harris, Matt. "Who Purchased Gwadar?" CPIC Global. February 11, 2019. Accessed 
April 30, 2019. https://www.cpicglobal.com/who-purchased-gwadar/. 
 
 
Harrison, S. S. (2006, October 01). Pakistan's Baloch insurgency. Retrieved from 
https://mondediplo.com/2006/10/05Balochistan 
 
 
Hashmi, W. (2018). 'Fierce and Warlike': Could the Baloch Separatist Movement Remain 
Pakistan's Longest Insurgency?  
 
 
Heinkel, J. C., & DeVillafranca, R. (2016). Could Pakistan Lose Balochistan? 
Balochistan's Insurgency and Its Implications for Pakistan and the Region. 
Journal of Strategic Intelligence, 62-72. 
 
 
Human Rights Watch. "We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years" | Enforced 
Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan. (2015, April 29). 
Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/07/28/we-can-torture-kill-or-
keep-you-years/enforced-disappearances-pakistan-security 
 65 
 
 
Iqbal, A. R. (2011). Social Mobilisation and Online Separtist Movement in Balochistan. 
Margalla Papers, 129-154. 
 
 
Jardine, E. (2014). The Insurgent's Dilemma: A Theory of Mobilization and Conflict 
Outcome (Doctoral thesis, Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario, 2014) (pp. 1-
346). Ottawa: Carleton University. 
 
Javaid, U. (2010). Concerns of Balochistan: Effects and Implications on Federation of 
Pakistan. Journal of Political Studies.  
 
 
Javaid, Umbreen, and Javeria Jahangir. "Balochistan: A Key Factor in Global Politics." 
South Asian Studies (1026-678X)30, no. 2 (2015). 
 
 
Kanwal, Gurmeet. "Pakistan's Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China's String of 
Pearls in the Indo-Pacific." Pakistan's Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China's 
String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific | Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
October 08, 2015. Accessed April 30, 2019. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-
string-pearls-indo-pacific. 
 
  
Khan, Hafeez Ullah, and Sana Ullah. "BALOCHISTAN; ETHNO-NATIONALISM 
AND ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT." Journal of Research Society of 
Pakistan 54, no. 2 (December 31, 2017). Accessed September 5, 2018. Nexus 
Uni. 
 
 
Khan, A. (2009). Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The 
Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation. Asian Survey, 49(6), 
1071-1091. doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.6.1071 
 
 
Khan, M. (2012). Balochistan: the forgotten frontier. Strategic Studies, 32(4/1). 
 
 
Kilcullen, D. J. (2006). Counterinsurgency Redux (4th ed., Vol. 48). Survival. 
doi:10.1080/00396330601062790 
 
 
Kupecz, M. (2012). PAKISTAN’S BALOCH INSURGENCY: History, Conflict Drivers, 
and Regional Implications. International Affairs Review, 20(3), 95-110. 
 66 
 
 
Lyall, J., & Wilson, I. (2009). Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars. International Organization, 63(01), 67. 
doi:10.1017/s0020818309090031 
 
 
 Lynn, J. A. (2005, July-August). Patterns of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Military 
Review, 85(4), 22+. Retrieved from 
http://link.galegroup.com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/apps/doc/A135843309/ITOF?u=
maine_orono&sid=ITOF&xid=e9f56cd3 
 
 
Mao, Z., & Griffith, S. B. (1989). Mao Tse-Tung on guerrilla warfare. Washington DC: 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. 
 
 
Mao, Z. (1967). On protracted war. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.  
 
 
Mazhar, M. S., Javaid, U., & Goraya, N. S. (2012). Balochistan (from strategic 
significance to US involvement). Journal of Political Studies, 19(1), 113. 
 
 
Nandy, C. (2018, May 1). Two Ex-RAW Chiefs Did Not Want Kulbhushan Jadhav 
Recruited As Spy. Retrieved from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180105141430/https:/www.thequint.com/news/pol
itics/two-former-raw-chiefs-did-not-want-kulbhushan-jadhav-recruited-as-spy 
 
 
Or, Whether. "Patterns of insurgency and counterinsurgency." Military Review (2005).  
 
 
Pakistan: The worsening conflict in Balochistan (Asia Report). (2006). Islamabad: 
International Crisis Group. 
 
  
PAKISTAN 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (pp. 1-54, Rep.). (2017). Washington 
DC: United States Department of State. 
 
 
Pakistan: The worsening conflict in Balochistan (Asia Report). (2006). Islamabad: 
International Crisis Group 
 
 
Pike, John. "Balochistan Insurgency." Global Security. 
 67 
 
 
Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s (HRCP) Fact-Finding Missions, 
“Conflict in Balochistan” (December 2005-January 2006). 
 
 
Samad, Y. (2015). Understanding the insurgency in Balochistan. In State and Nation-
Building in Pakistan (pp. 136-163). Routledge. 
 
 
Sareen, S. (2010). Balochistan is no Bangladesh. Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses. Retrieved from https://idsa.in/node/4887/88. 
 
 
Siddiqi, F. H. (2012). The politics of ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and 
Mohajir ethnic movements. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
Shahid, S., & Jamal, N. (2018, May 15). Balochistan presents budget with massive 
Rs61.9bn deficit.  
 
 
Seth G. Jones & Patrick B. Johnston (2013) The Future of Insurgency, Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, 36:1, 1-25, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.739077 
 
 
Testimony of Ali Dayan Hasan before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
regarding Human Rights in Balochistan. (2015, April 17). 
 
 
Trinquier, R. (2008). Modern warfare: A French view of counterinsurgency. Westport, 
CT: Praeger Security International. 
 
 
U. (2017, April 13). Balochistan: Abductions and Extrajudicial Killings Used as Tools to 
Impose State Census and Pave Way for CPEC. Retrieved from 
https://unpo.org/article/20027 
 
 
Veena, Yogeena. "How Balochistan Became a Part of Pakistan – a Historical 
Perspective." The Nation. December 05, 2015. 
http://southasiajournal.net/accession-of-independent-Balochistan-to-pakistan/ 
 
 
 68 
Voice of Baloch Missing Persons. (n.d.). A Brief Report by Voice for Baloch Missing 
Persons (VBMP) about Human Rights Violations in Balochistan. Retrieved from 
http://Balochwarna.com/2016/05/30/a-brief-report-by-voice-for-Baloch-missing-
persons-vbmp-about-human-rights-violations-in-Balochistan/ 
 
 
"War on Terror to War on Dissent: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan." Economic & 
Political Weekly, 28 Apr. 2018. Business Collection, 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A536556022/ITBC?u=maine_orono&sid=ITB
C&xid=a677c32c. Accessed 15 Feb. 2019. 
 
 
Weinstein, Adam. "Afghanistan's Long Ignored Second Front in Balochistan." Atlantic 
Council. June 1, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2018. 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/afghanistan-s-long-ignored-
second-front-in-Balochistan. 
 
 
Wilkens, A. (2015). The Crowded-Out Conflict: Pakistan's Balochistan in Its Fifth round 
of Insurgency, ǁ. Afghanistan Analysts Network. 
 
 
Wirsing, R. (2008). Baloch nationalism and the geopolitics of energy resources: The 
changing context of separatism in Pakistan (pp. 1-63). Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 
 
 
World Bank. Balochistan, Pakistan Strengthening Budget Management to Improve 
Education Service Delivery (pp. 1-38, Rep.). (2018). Washington DC: World 
Bank Group. 
 
 
Yusufzai, A. (2017, July 18). Pakistan increases budget for police, security forces. 
Retrieved from http://pakistan.asia-
news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_pf/features/2017/07/18/feature-02 
 
 
Yousafzai, G. (2018, August 11). Five wounded in attack on bus ferrying Chinese 
workers in Pakistan. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-
blast-china/five-wounded-in-attack-on-bus-ferrying-chinese-workers-in-pakistan-
idUSKBN1KW05B 
 
  
 69 
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY 
Tiffany Tanner was born on May 29, 1998. She lived in Pennsylvania and 
California before moving to Maine, where she has spent most of her life. She graduated 
from Brunswick High School in 2016, and choose to attend the University of Maine to 
continue her education and passion for international relations through a B.A. in 
International Affairs with concentration in International Security and a minor in Political 
Science. She is concurrently a candidate for a M.A. in Global Policy at the University of 
Maine School of Policy and International Affairs. Following undergraduate 
commencement in May 2019, she will be interning at the German American Chamber of 
Commerce California in Leipzig, Germany for a year.  
 
